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THROWING OUT THE BABY WITH THE BATH WATER:
THE IMPACT OF UNITED STATES V. GOODNER
BROTHERS AIRCRAFT
SARAH L. INDERBITZIN*
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1976, Congress promulgated the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act ("RCRA")' to address the problems caused by improper
handling of hazardous waste which resulted in thousands of leaking,
unregulated sites across the United States.2 RCRA was designed to create
a "cradle to grave" system for handling waste from its generation through
its disposal.3 RCRA covers the management of both solid waste and
hazardous waste.4 Hazardous waste is partly defined as "solid waste"
which may "pose a substantial present or potential hazard to human health
or the environment when improperly stored, transported, or disposed of, or
otherwise managed." 5
Whether a waste is classified as "hazardous" is critical in
determining if the waste is subject to RCRA hazardous waste regulatory
* Sarah L. Inderbitzin is an Attorney Advisor for the Office of the Solicitor of the United
States Department of the Interior. Ms. Inderbitzin received her B.S. in Animal Science
from the University of Maryland and her J.D. from Georgia State University. She
recently served on the Founding Board of The Environmental Lawyer, Section of Natural
Resources, Energy, and Environmental Law, American Bar Association, The George
Washington University National Law Center as Citation Editor. Ms. Inderbitzin is
currently pursuing an LL.M. in Environmental Law at the George Washington University
National Law Center.
This paper was written by Ms. Inderbitzin in her private capacity. No official
support or endorsement by the Department of the Interior, any person or office within the
agency, or any other agency of the Federal government is intended or inferred.
1. Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795 (1976) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-
6987 (1988)).
2. James C. Morriss, III & Cheryl L. Coon, Who's on First, What's on Second, or a
Discussion of the Scope and Potential Misuse of the "Mixture" and "Derived-From"
Rules and "Contained-In" Policy, 44 SW. L.J. 1531, 1532 (1991).
3. Shell Oil Co. v. EPA, 950 F.2d 741, 745 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
4. Id.
5. 42 U.S.C. § 6903(5) (1988).
WM. & MARY ENvTL. L. & POL'Y REV.
requirements.6 The Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") defined the
following four categories of hazardous waste: (1) the substance is listed
by EPA as a hazardous waste,7 (2) the substance exhibits any of the
characteristics of hazardous waste (corrosivity, ignitability, toxicity or
reactivity),' (3) the substance comes from the treatment, storage or disposal
of hazardous waste (the "derived-from" rule)9 or (4) the substance is a
mixture of hazardous and solid waste (the "mixture rule"). 10
Once a substance is identified as a hazardous waste, it must meet
the requirements imposed by Subtitle C of RCRA." If a person generates,
transports, treats, stores or disposes of a substance which falls into one of
the four categories defined as hazardous waste without complying with
Subtitle C requirements, it is a violation of Subchapter C and subject to an
EPA enforcement action.' 2 EPA used the mixture rule as a basis for such
RCRA enforcement actions from its promulgation in 198013 until it was
invalidated on procedural grounds in 1991 by Shell Oil Co. v.
Environmental Protection Agency.' 4  The Shell Oil decision was then
applied retroactively, rendering the mixture rule void ab initio in United
States v. Goodner Brothers Aircraft.15
In an effort to close the regulatory gap left by those decisions, EPA
has attempted to utilize state mixture rules in pending enforcement actions
based on the mixture rule. 16 However, courts have disallowed EPA from
utilizing state mixture rules in federal enforcement proceedings because the
scope of the state rules is greater than that of the federal mixture rule. 7
An additional problem created by Shell Oil, Goodner Brothers
Aircraft and subsequent cases is that parties found liable for RCRA
violations in past proceedings based on the mixture rule may now attempt
6. Richard M. Filosa, United States v. Goodner Brothers Aircraft, Inc.: Environmental
Justice or Disaster?, 28 NEw ENG. L. REv. 133 (1993). See also Morriss, supra note 2,
at 1535.
7. 40 C.F.R. § 261.3(a)(2)(ii) (1993).
8. Id. § 261.3(a)(2)(i).
9. Id. See also infra note 31.
10. 40 C.F.R. § 261.3(a)(2)(iv). See also infra note 30 and accompanying text.
11. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6921-6934.
12. Filosa, supra note 6, at 137.
13. Id at 133.
14. 950 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1991). See infra notes 33-61 and accompanying text.
15. 966 F.2d 380 (8th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 967 (1993). See infra notes
62-98 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 99-135 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 99-135 and accompanying text.
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to challenge those outcomes. Because those decisions essentially "threw
the baby out" (by retroactive application of the Shell Oil decision and
cutting off state mixture rules as a source of enforcement) "with the bath
water" (invalidation of the mixture rule), it appears EPA has no choice but
to revise its litigation strategy in pending cases to rely on other RCRA
regulations in order to impose liability.
This paper examines the impact of Goodner Brothers Aircraft on
the pending mixture rule cases brought by EPA. Part II discusses the
regulatory background of the mixture rule. Part III examines the Shell Oil
decision. Part IV analyzes the Goodner Brothers Aircraft decision. Part
V contains an exploration of the cases brought after the Goodner Brothers
Aircraft decision and the implications to EPA's enforcement scheme. Part
VI summarizes and concludes the various discussions contained in this
paper.
II. REGULATORY BACKGROUND OF THE "MIXTURE RULE"
RCRA required EPA to develop and promulgate criteria for
identifying hazardous wastes and to list specific wastes. 8 In addition, EPA
was to promulgate regulations governing generators, transporters and
operators of treatment, storage and disposal facilities "as may be necessary
to protect human health and the environment."' 9 Congress gave EPA a
statutory deadline of April 21, 1978, to promulgate the regulations.20
After publication of a Notice of Intent to Develop Rulemaking, 2' an
Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,22 and circulation of drafts of
regulations for comments,23 EPA issued proposed regulations which
covered most of the standards required by RCRA.24 However, when EPA
failed to meet its April deadline for issuing the final regulations, it was
sued to force it to do so. 2 ' The District Court initially ordered EPA to
18. 42 U.S.C. § 6921(a); Shell Oil, 950 F.2d at 745.
19. Id. §§ 6922-6924; Shell Oil, 950 F.2d at 745-46.
20. Id § 6921(a).
21. 42 Fed. Reg. 9803 (1977) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. ch. 1) (proposed Feb. 11,
1977).
22. 42 Fed. Reg. 22,332 (1977) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 250) (proposed May 2,
1977).
23. Shell Oil, 950 F.2d at 746.
24. 42 Fed. Reg. 58,946-59,022 (1978) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 250) (proposed
Dec. 18, 1978); Shell Oil, 950 F.2d at 746.
25. Shell Oil, 950 F.2d at 746.
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promulgate the final regulations by December 31, 1979.26 However, the
court modified its order to require EPA to "use its best efforts"' 27 to issue
the regulations by April 1980, due to the complex nature of those
regulations.28
On May 19, 1980, EPA published the revisions to the final rule and
interim final rule for identifying and listing hazardous wastes. 29 Included
in the regulations was the so-called "mixture rule" which provides that a
waste will be treated as hazardous if "[i]t is a mixture of solid waste and
one or more hazardous wastes listed in subpart D of this part and has not
been excluded from paragraph (a)(2) of this section under §§ 260.20 and
"130260;22 of this chapter ....
Following publication, more than fifty petitions were submitted
challenging the mixture rule.3' The challenges were made up of industry
and public interest groups and were eventually consolidated as Shell Oil
Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency. 2
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. 45 Fed.. Reg. 33,066 (1980); Shell Oil, 950 F.2d at 746. The agency noted in the
Federal Register that, because of the pressures imposed by time and limited information,
it "was unable to avoid underregulation and overregulation." Shell Oil, 950 F.2d at 746
(citing 45 Fed. Reg. 33,088 (1989)).
30. 40 C.F.R. § 261.3(a)(2)(ii) (1993) (initially promulgated at 45 Fed. Reg. 33,119
(1980)).
31. Shell Oil, 950 F.2d at 746. The petitions also challenged the "derived from" rule
which automatically defined residues resulting from the treatment of any listed waste as
hazardous. 40 C.F.R. § 261.3(c)(2) (1991); Shell Oil, 950 F.2d at 745. See also Alex S.
Karlin, 1991-1992 Legal Developments: Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, in
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW UPDATE 1992, at 11-18 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course
Handbook Series No. H-445, Sept.-Oct. 1992) (discussing the legal challenges and court
dispositions regarding the "mixture rule" and "derived-from rule"). However, this article
will only address the challenges to the mixture rule since the arguments regarding both
rules are substantially the same.
32. 950 F.2d at 746. See Alan Gates, Does Arkansas or (Anyone Else) Have a Valid
Mixture or Derived-From Rule?, 15 U. ARK. LITLE ROCK L.J. 697, 701-02 (1993). The
court deferred briefing on the challenges in order to give the parties time to settle the
issues. Shell Oil, 950 F.2d at 746; Gates, supra at 702. Most of the issues were resolved
by settlement, amendments to RCRA or EPA regulations or because some petitioners
failed to continue their lawsuit. Shell Oil, 950 F.2d at 746; Gates, supra at 702. In
January 1987 EPA finally identified the remaining issues unlikely to be settled. Shell Oil,
950 F.2d at 746; Gates, supra at 702.
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III. INVALIDATION OF THE "MIXTURE RULE":
SHELL OIL CO. v. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
In Shell Oil the consolidated petitioners asserted in their remaining
challenge that inclusion of the mixture rule in the final regulations
deprived them of the adequate notice and opportunity to comment required
by the provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") 33 and
RCRA.34 RCRA provides that "the [EPA] Administrator shall, after notice
and opportunity for public hearing, and after consultation with appropriate
Federal and State agencies, develop and promulgate criteria for identifying
the characteristics of hazardous waste,. and for listing hazardous waste.
. .",35 RCRA also requires EPA to promulgate. rules in accordance with
APA requirements.3 6 The APA requires that notice of a proposed rule be
published in the Federal Register to allow opportunity for public comment
for a specified period, evaluation of comments received, and promulgation
of the rule in its final form.37
The court in Shell Oil discussed the inquiry it must undertake when
a final rule is challenged for procedural defects.38 Whether notice is.
adequate is determined by "the relationship between the proposed'
regulations and the final rule. 3 . If the final rule is a "logical outgrowth"
of the proposed rule, the court will validate the rule in spite of differences
between the two.40  However, if the difference between the final and
proposed rules is "too sharp," it will not be considered adequate notice and
opportunity for comment."
The court found, and EPA acknowledged, that the final mixture rule
lacked a clear antecedent in the proposed rule.42 However, EPA argued
33. 5 U.S.C §§ 701-706 (1988).
34. Shell Oil, 950 F.2d at 746-47; 42 U.S.C. §§ 6921(a), 6974(b), 6976 (1988).
Petitioners also argued that EPA expanded its statutory authority in promulgating the
mixture rule as part of the definition of hazardous waste. Shell Oil, 950 F.2d at 746.
However, the court did not address this substantive argument because the rule was vacated
on procedural grounds. Id. at 752.
35. 42 U.S.C. § 6921(a) (emphasis added).
36. 42 U.S.C § 6976 (1976) (citing 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706).
37. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1988). See also Filosa, supra note 6, at 139-40.
38. Shell Oil, 950 F.2d at 744-45.
39. Id. at 747.
40. Id.
41. Id. (citing American Fed'n of Labor v. Donovan, 757 F.2d 330, 338-39 (D.C. Cir.
1985)).
42. Id. at 749.
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that it "intended" to include the mixture rule in the proposed regulations
and added it to the final rules to "close 'a major loop hole in the Subtitle
C management system.""
The "loop hole" EPA sought to plug was its fear that generators of
hazardous waste could avoid hazardous waste requirements by simply
mixing Subpart D wastes with nonhazardous solid waste." This mixing
would thus create a waste that exhibited none of the testable characteristics
of hazardous waste but would still pose an environmental threat for other
reasons.45 EPA argued that the rule "merely clarifi[ed]" its intent that
listed wastes remain hazardous until delisted and that generators could not
"reasonably assume" that they could remove a waste from the hazardous
list by just mixing it with nonhazardous waste.46 Thus, EPA concluded
that industry could not argue that the mixture rule was "a bolt from the
blue" since the rule was foreseeable.47
The court was "unimpressed" by the "scanty evidence" EPA offered
in support of its position.48 EPA relied on comments from industry and its
responses to support its position that the notice was adequate. 49 The court
noted that a comment from industry stating that it was unreasonable to
make a listed waste hazardous, no matter what its concentration, referred
to the initial classification of a waste as hazardous, not to the mixing of
wastes.5° The court also rejected EPA's assertion that its response to a
question from the American Mining Congress, that a waste could only be
removed from RCRA regulation by delisting, should have alerted industry
that delisting was the only way to escape RCRA regulation. 1
Based on this "scanty evidence" in the proposed rulemaking, the
court in Shell Oil held that the differences between the proposed and final
rules were too substantial to find that the mixture rule was a "logical
outgrowth" of the proposed regulation.5 2 EPA's "unexpressed intention"
was not sufficient to convert the final rule into a logical outgrowth of the
43. Id. (quoting 45 Fed. Reg. 33,095 (1980)).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 749-50.
47. Id. at 750 (citing W.J.G. Tel. Co. v. FCC, 675 F.2d 386, 388-90 (D.C. Cir. 1982)).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 752.
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proposed rule that the public could have anticipated.53 The agency did not
provide the required notice and thus deprived the public of the
"opportunity to anticipate and criticize the rules or to offer alternatives."54
Accordingly, the mixture rule was "set aside" and "remanded" to EPA."
As noted, the court "set aside" and "remanded" the mixture rule. 6
However, the court created confusion as to the status of the rule by
subsequently stating that, since it had "vacate[d]" the rule on procedural
grounds, it would not address the substantive issues."' EPA, concerned that
the Shell Oil decision would be applied retroactively in pending
enforcement cases, filed a Motion for Clarification.5" In its motion, EPA
specifically requested that the court add language to the Shell Oil decision
that the mixture rule was vacated prospectively only.59 The court denied
EPA's motion without comment60 and thus paved the way for the decision
in United States v. Goodner Brothers Aircraft.6'
53. Id. at 751.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 752. However, the court, concerned about the possible "dangers" presented by
discontinuity of hazardous waste regulation, suggested that pending full notice and
comment, EPA should reenact the mixture rule on an interim basis pursuant to the APA
exemption for "good cause." Id. (citing 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(B); Mid-Tex Elec. Coop.,
Inc. v. FERC, 822 F.2d 1123, 1131-34 (D.C. Cir. 1987)).
56. Id.
57. See Mary Ellen Henry, Environmental Law-Retroactive Vacature of the Mixture and
Derived-From Rules Under RCRA. United States v. Goodner Bros. Aircraft, Inc., 966 F.2d
380 (8th Cir. 1992), 15 U. ARK. LIT'LE ROCK L.J. 727 (1993); Filosa, supra note 6, at
141.
58. Appellant's Response to Appellee's Additional Brief at 9, United States v. Goodner
Bros. Aircraft, Inc., 966 F.2d 380 (8th Cir. 1992) (No. 91-2466).
59. Id.; see Filosa, supra note 6, at 141; Gates, supra note 32, at 704. EPA also stated
in the Federal Register that it believed the Shell Oil decision should not be applied
retroactively when it readopted the mixture rule on an interim basis. 57 Fed. Reg. 7628,
7630-31 (1992) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 261). See Gates, supra note 32, at 703-
04.
60. Shell Oil Co. v. EPA, No. 80-1532 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 5, 1992) (order denying Motion
for Clarification and dismissing Motion for Leave to File as Amicus Curiae).
61. 966 F.2d 380 (8th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 967 (1993). See, e.g., Filosa,
supra note 6, at 141; Henry, supra note 57.
1994]
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IV. RETROACTIVE VACATURE OF THE MIXTURE RULE:
UNITED STATES V. GOODNER BROTHERS AIRCRAFT
Goodner Brothers Aircraft, Inc., and Junior Goodner, its owner and
operator, were criminally convicted by the district court for violations of
section 6928(d)(2)(A) of RCRA.62 The violations arose from disposal of
spent paint remover mixed with removed paint on the Goodner Brothers
Farm.63 The Arkansas Department of Pollution Control and Ecology and
EPA discovered the violation when a neighbor reported that she saw "two
men dumping creamy beige, toxic-smelling waste into a ravine" on the
farm. 64
Subsequent testing of samples of the waste revealed that it
contained up to twenty percent of a listed hazardous waste.6' The district
court sentenced Goodner Brothers Aircraft to five years probation, a
$150,000 fine and a $250 special assessment.66 Junior Goodner was
sentenced to a $7,500 fine, fifteen months in prison and a $200 special
assessment.67
The Eighth Circuit overturned the convictions because they were
based partly on the mixture rule invalidated by Shell Oil.68 The district
court had instructed the jury that mixtures of listed hazardous waste, as
well as listed wastes, are hazardous waste. 69  The court further instructed
the jury that one element necessary to prove the RCRA violation was that
EPA had either listed or identified the waste at issue as hazardous.70 Thus,
62. Goodner Bros. Aircraft, 966 F.2d at 382-83. Section 6928(d)(2)(A) makes it a crime
to "knowingly treat[], store[], or dispose[] of any hazardous waste ... without a permit
.... " 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(2)(A).
63. Goodner Bros. Aircraft, 966 F.2d at 382-83. The Goodner Brothers Aircraft business
repainted airplanes. Id. at 382. The process involved spraying undiluted paint remover
on the planes which caused the paint to dissolve and slide off the planes. Id. The planes
were then sprayed with high pressure water to remove the dissolved paint and solvent.
Id. The waste was collected off the ground, put into barrels and disposed of in three pits
on the Goodner Brothers Farm. Id. at 382-83.
64. Id. at 383 (quoting the testimony of the witness).
65. Id. ("[T]he samples from the dumpsites were found to contain up to 20% phenol and,
in several cases, up to 20% methylene chloride").
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 383-85. The Eighth Circuit reversed the counts based upon the mixture rule
and remanded them for retrial. Id. at 385.
69. Id. at 383-84.
70. Id. at 383.
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the jury could have based the convictions on the Goodner waste being
either listed hazardous waste or mixed waste.7'
When a jury verdict may be supported on two grounds and it is
impossible to determine which ground the jury selected, the verdict must
be set aside if one ground has been found unconstitutional or illegal.72 In
Goodner Brothers Aircraft, the jury verdict could have been based on the
mixture rule found to be illegal by the District of Columbia Circuit in Shell
Oil.73 Accordingly, the Eighth Circuit set aside the verdict since it was
impossible to tell whether the jury found the Goodner waste to be a listed
waste or mixed waste.74
Unlike the court in Shell Oil, the court in Goodner Brothers
Aircraft chose to address the retroactivity issue when EPA argued that
invalidation of the mixture rule did not apply retroactively. 75 EPA asserted
that because the court in Shell Oil had the authority to leave the mixture
rule in place while EPA corrected its procedural shortcomings, "under the
same authority . . .it chose to invalidate the rule only prospectively. 76
EPA supported its assertion by pointing to the court's language in Shell Oil
that promulgation of an interim mixture rule would avoid "discontinuity in
the regulation of hazardous wastes., 77 EPA thus contended that the Shell
Oil court intended to invalidate the -rule prospectively "because
discontinuity would not exist if the rule was void ab initio. 78
The Eighth Circuit rejected EPA's argument "because it [was]
inconsistent with the language in Shell Oil that specifically pronounce[d]
that the rule [was] 'vacated' and 'set aside."' 79 The court gave great
weight to a prior District of Columbia Circuit decision that defined
"vacate" to mean "'to annul; to cancel or rescind; to declare, to make, or
to render, void; to defeat; to deprive of force; to make of no authority or
71. Id. at 384.
72. Griffin v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 466, 474 (1991).
73. Goodner Bros. Aircraft, 966 F.2d at 384.
74. Id. at 384-85.
75. Id. at 384.
76. Id.
77. Id. (quoting Shell Oil, 950 F.2d at 752) (emphasis added). See also supra note 55.
78. Goodner Bros. Aircraft, 966 F.2d at 384. EPA reasoned that if there never had been
a mixture rule, there could be no discontinuity for the court to be concerned about since
the rule would never have existed in the first place. Id.
79. Id. (quoting Shell Oil, 950 F.2d at 752).
1994]
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validity; to set aside."' ' ° Thus, the court concluded that the mixture rule
was invalidated retroactively.8'
The circuit court also found no merit in EPA's "discontinuity"
argument since the court's language in Shell Oil could have been referring
to the practical effect that invalidation of the mixture rule might have on
compliance practices of the regulated industries, and not on its legal
force. 2
EPA's final argument was that invalidation of the mixture rule
should apply only prospectively pursuant to the Chevron Oil Co. v.
Huson"3 test. Under the Chevron Oil test a rule should not be invalidated
retroactively if retroactive application of a decision would: (1) "establish
a new principle of law, including overruling clear past precedent," 4 (2)
"further retard the rule's operation, '""8 and (3) impose "inequity ...by
retroactive application." 6 EPA pointed out that retroactive application
would overrule clear precedent because it had relied on the mixture rule in
enforcement proceedings since its promulgation in 1980.7 In addition,
EPA noted that the rule had a valuable purpose since it plugged a
regulatory "loophole"8' by preventing dilution as a treatment for hazardous
waste, and was invalidated on procedural, not substantive, grounds.8 9
Finally, retroactive application would be inequitable by rewarding those
who had not complied with the mixture rule for the period it was in place
and presumptively valid.90
The Eighth Circuit rejected EPA's reliance on the Chevron Oil test
because retroactive application of the decision in Shell Oil was "consistent
with the Supreme Court's recent decision in . . . which the Court
announced that full retroactivity is the normal rule in civil cases and
80. Id. (quoting Action on Smoking & Health v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 713 F.2d 795,
797 (D.C. Cir. 1983)).
81. Id. at 385 ("[W]e find invalidation of the mixture rule applies retroactively.").
82. Id. at 384-85.
83. 404 U.S. 97 (1971).
84. Chevron Oil Co., 404 U.S. at 106.
85. Id. at 107.
86. Id.
87. Additional Brief for Appellee at 9, United States v. Goodner Bros. Aircraft, 966 F.2d
380 (8th Cir. 1992) (No. 91-2466). See also Henry, supra note 57.
88. Shell Oil, 950 F.2d at 749; see supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
89. Additional Brief for Appellee at 9, Goodner Bros. Aircraft (No. 91-2466). See also
Henry, supra note 57.
90. Additional Brief for Appellee at 9, Goodner Bros. Aircraft (No. 91-2466). See also
Henry, supra note 57.
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limited the applicability of Chevron Oil['s] . . . test for prospectivity."'
James B. Beam Distilling Co. held that when a new rule of civil law is
applied to the litigants in the case in which it was announced, the new rule
must be given full retroactive effect.92 The court in Goodner Brothers
Aircraft reasoned that because the court in Shell Oil did not reach the
substantive merits of the mixture rule, and invalidated the rule on
procedural grounds, it applied its decision to the litigants in that case.93
Otherwise, the Shell Oil court would have had to address the substantive
issue. 94
EPA also attempted to avoid reversal by asserting that it could rely
on the Arkansas mixture rule rather than the vacated federal rule. 9" The
court found reliance on the state rule "inappropriate" because (1) Goodner
Brothers Aircraft was convicted under the federal statute and (2) the
federal law did not incorporate the Arkansas definitions of hazardous
waste.96
The court in Goodner Brothers Aircraft seems to have incorrectly
analyzed the applicability of state mixture rules.97 EPA regulations
specifically adopt state rules into the federal RCRA program as long as
they are not more stringent or greater in scope than the federal rules. 98 As
a result of the faulty reasoning in Goodner Brothers Aircraft regarding the
applicability of state mixture rules, the door was left open for subsequent
cases to address that issue.
V. IMPACT OF GOODNER BROTHERS AIRCRAFT: STATE MIXTURE
RULES MAY NOT BE USED IN PENDING FEDERAL PROCEEDINGS
In Hardin County 99 EPA filed a civil complaint alleging that
county operations of a municipal solid waste landfill violated RCRA based
91. Goodner Bros. Aircraft, 966 F.2d at 385 (quoting Bottineau Farmers Elevator v.
Woodward-Clyde Consultants, 963 F.2d 1064, 1074 (8th Cir. 1992), and citing James B.
Bean Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529 (1991)).
92. James B. Beam Distilling Co., 501 U.S. 529.
93. Goodner Bros. Aircraft, 966 F.2d at 385.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Filosa, supra note 6, at 154-55.
98. Id.; 40 C.F.R. §§ 271.1-.26 (1993).
99. In re Hardin County, No. RCRA-V-W-89-R-29, 1992 RCRA LEXIS 23 (EAB July
10, 1992).
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on the mixture rule.' 0 The county argued that vacature of the mixture rule
by Shell Oil rendered it void ab initio.'0 ' The Administrative Law Judge
("AL") agreed that the mixture rule's invalidation applied retroactively
and dismissed EPA's complaint.'0 2 Although the ALJ found Goodner
Brothers Aircraft distinguishable because it was based on a criminal
complaint and thus required "special considerations not applicable in the
civil context,"'0 3 he still found that decision persuasive authority.04 Thus,
the Goodner Brothers Aircraft retroactivity ruling applies to both pending
civil and criminal cases based on the mixture rule.
EPA appealed the ALJ's decision dismissing its complaint to the
Environmental Appeals Board ("EAB") in Hardin County 11.15 The EAB
remanded the case for further consideration because the record was unclear
as to whether the landfill accepted shipments of "hazardous waste."'0 6
Thus, the EAB could not determine whether the federal or State of Ohio
mixture rule applied. 7 The court held, however, that it was error for the
ALJ to dismiss the case based on Shell Oil because that case would not be
applicable "if the federal mixture rule [was] not implicated in [the]
case."' ' The EAB reasoned that if the state rule were applicable, it would
have been promulgated by procedures different from those of the federal
mixture rule and thus would not be invalidated by Shell Oil. 109 In addition,
in states authorized by EPA to administer their hazardous waste program,
EPA may bring an enforcement action for violations of the state
program.1 Thus, the case was remanded to determine if the state was
authorized at the time of the violation, thereby making the state mixture
rule available for EPA's enforcement proceeding.
On remand in Hardin County III, "' the ALJ again dismissed EPA's
complaint based on EPA's prior interpretation of the mixture rule and EPA
100. Id.
101. Id. at *8.
102. Id. at *15.
103. Id. at *11 n.6.
104. Id.
105. In re of Hardin County, No. RCRA-V-89-29, 1992 RCRA LEXIS 102 (EAB Nov.
6, 1992).
106. Id. at *15.
107. Id.
108. Id. at *12.
109. Id. at *14
110. Id. at *6-8.
111. In re Hardin County, No. RCRA-V-W-89-R-29, 1993 RCRA LEXIS 109 (EAB May
27, 1993).
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guidance regarding EPA enforcement of state hazardous waste
regulations." 2 Traditionally EPA interpreted section 3009 of RCRA to
authorize EPA to enforce state regulations that are more stringent than the
federal regulations but not broader in scope.' 3  In an internal EPA
guidance document, the agency set forth criteria for determining whether
a state regulation is broader in scope or more stringent than the federal
requirement by asking:
(1) Does imposition of the State requirement increase the
size of the regulated community beyond that of the Federal
program?
A State requirement that does increase the size of the
regulated community is more "extensive", not more
stringent, and is an aspect of the State program which goes
beyond the scope of the Federally-approved program.
Examples of requirements that are broader in scope include:
.. listing of wastes which are not in the Federal universe
of wastes.
If the requirement does not increase the size of the
regulated community, the following question should be
asked.
(2) Does the requirement in question have a direct
counterpart in the Federal regulatory program?
If the State requirement does not have a direct Federal
counterpart, the requirement is also beyond the scope of the
Federal regulatory program." 4
EPA argued that the scope of the regulated community is
determined by listing the hazardous waste, not by the regulations which
112. Id. at *24-28.
113. Id. at *8-9. See also EPA Mem., EPA Enforcement of RCRA-Authorized State
Hazardous Waste Laws and Regulation, Directive No. 9541.01-82x (March 15, 1982).
114. United States v. Reticel Foam Corp., 858 F. Supp. 726, 742 (E.D. Tenn. 1993)
(quoting a memorandum prepared by Lee M. Thomas, Assistant Administrator for Solid
Waste and Emergency Response, Doc. 174, Exhibit 4, Source Doc. #9541.04(84) at 2-3
(May 21, 1984)).
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determine how long it remains hazardous." 5 Thus, EPA concluded that the
state mixture rule only made the program "more stringent" by clarifying
how long the waste remained regulated under Subtitle C but did not
"expand" the regulated community." 6 The ALJ rejected that argument
because, according to EPA's own interpretations at the time the mixture
rule was promulgated, it "clearly increased the size of the regulated
community."",17
EPA also asserted that the original listing of the waste as hazardous
in the federal program was the direct counterpart to the state mixture
rule."' EPA concluded that the mixture rule is just a more "stringent"
requirement for how to exit RCRA regulation." 9
This argument was also rejected because invalidation of the mixture
rule by the Shell Oil decision meant "there is no direct federal counterpart
to the Ohio rule."' 2° Thus, the Ohio mixture rule was "broader in scope"
than the federal rule and could not be enforced under section 271.112 of
EPA regulations.
122
The AL's decision was affirmed by the EAB in Hardin County
IV. 123 That case was affirmed based on the same principles announced in
Hardin County 111.124 The EAB stated:
It is our view that as a result of the Shell Oil decision the
size of the regulated community under the Ohio mixture
rule is larger than the size of the regulated community
under the surviving provisions of the federal hazardous
waste program . . . .Consequently, the agency's own
guidance dictates dismissal of this proceeding.
125
115. Hardin County 111, 1993 RCRA LEXIS at *11.
116. Id.
117. Id. at *24. The court referenced EPA's statement that the mixture rule was enacted
to cover generators who could avoid RCRA by simply mixing listed waste with solid
waste. Id. (citing 45 Fed. Reg. 33,095 (1980)).
118. Hardin County III, 1993 RCRA LEXIS at *11.
119. Id. at *11-13.
120. Id. at *27.
121. 40 C.F.R. § 271.1 (1993).
122. Hardin County III, 1993 RCRA LEXIS at *27.
123. In re Harding County, No. RCRA-V-W-89-R-29, 1994 RCRA LEXIS 6 (EAB Apr.
12, 1994).
124. Appeals Board Rules EPA Cannot Enforce Ohio Mixture Rule, Affecting Pending
Cases, Daily Envtl. Rep. (BNA), at AA-2 (Apr. 13, 1994) [hereinafter Appeals Board].
125. Id.
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Thus, the Hardin County series of cases has cumulated into a decision
which eliminates use of state mixture rules in federal enforcement
proceedings.
Industry representatives in pending mixture rule cases have reacted
favorably. 26 An attorney for Bethlehem Steel, while awaiting the Seventh
Circuit decision in United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp. ,127 stated that the
EAB ruling would be helpful and that he would send notice of the decision
to the Seventh Circuit panel to assist them in their decision. 2 1 In addition,
that industry representative indicated that the EAB decision also could have
favorably affected United States v. Reticel Foam Corp. ,29 wherein the
district court magistrate recommended that EPA's complaint be dismissed
based on invalidation of the mixture rule. 3°
The Hardin County IV decision will also have an impact on the
final decision in In re Amoco Oil Co. '' In that case EPA filed actions
against Amoco for violations of Virginia's hazardous waste regulations,
including the Virginia mixture rule. 3 2 After the decision in Shell Oil,
Amoco filed a Motion for Dismissal of the counts which relied on the
invalidated federal mixture rule.'33 EPA once again attempted to argue that
the state rules were not broader in scope than the federal rules, only more
stringent. 1' The ALJ declined to address EPA's arguments regarding the
enforceability of the state mixture rule pending the outcome of the Hardin
126. Id.
127. United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 26,963 (7th Cir.
1994).
128. Appeals Board, supra note 124, at AA-1.
129. 858 F. Supp. 726 (E.D. Tenn. 1993).
130. Appeals Board, supra note 124, at AA-1. In Reticel Foam Corp., EPA advanced
substantially the same arguments as it had in Hardin County: that (1) the Tennessee rule
provided authority for the federal government to prosecute the case, (2) RCRA authorizes
EPA to prosecute defendants for violations of state rules, (3) the Tennessee rule was
properly adopted under state administrative procedures and (4) once a state is
"authorized," the applicable state regulations apply "in lieu of' the federal regulations.
Reticel Foam, 858 F. Supp. at 740-41. Using the same analysis as that adopted by the
EAB in Hardin County IV, the magistrate recommended that the complaint be dismissed
because the state mixture rule did not have a direct federal counterpart and was beyond
the scope of the federal regulatory program. Id. at 742-43.
131. No. RCRA-III-225, 1993 RCRA LEXIS 116 (U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency Sept.
15, 1993).
132. Id. at *1.
133. Id. at *8-9.
134. Id. at *9.
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County case.a 5 Given the outcome of Hardin IV, it is likely that the ALJ
will rule that EPA may not enforce the Virginia mixture rule.
There are, however, two bright spots on the EPA enforcement
forefront. First, the Hardin County IV case did not decide whether the
Ohio mixture rule survives the federal rule because the outcome of the case
was determined by EPA's lack of authority to enforce the Ohio rule.'36 In
addition, the language in Hardin County H indicates that state mixture
rules may survive invalidation of the federal mixture rule if properly
promulgated pursuant to state procedures.' Thus, until a court decides
otherwise, states may still enforce cases brought by the state based on their
own mixture rules. However, this does not assist EPA in its prosecution
of pending cases based on state mixture rules and, in all likelihood, will
result in dismissal of those cases.
Second, in In the Matter of Chem-Met Services, 31 the ALJ found
that, in some instances, waste defined as hazardous by the mixture rule
could also be covered by other existing regulations.139 In that case the
waste at issue was listed as a hazardous waste in EPA regulations other
than the mixture rule, 4' and had not been excluded from listing by other
provisions of that rule.' 4' In such instances invalidation of the mixture rule
would have no effect on the outcome of the case and thus would not
relieve the defendant of liability.'42 Thus, if EPA can cite to regulations
other than the mixture rule as applicable to the hazardous waste in a
pending proceeding, it will be able to pursue enforcement of those cases
in spite of invalidation of the mixture rule.
VI. CONCLUSION
Over a decade after promulgating regulations governing hazardous
waste, EPA is now faced with an enforcement crisis. The crisis began
with invalidation of the mixture rule in Shell oil.
43
135. Id. at *11-12.
136. Appeals Board, supra note 124, at AA-2.
137. See supra notes 105-110 and accompanying text.
138. No. RCRA-V-W-0 11-92, 1993 RCRA LEXIS 97 (EAB Feb. 23, 1993).
139. Id. at *20.
140. Id. at *18. See 40 C.F.R. § 261.32 (1993).
14. In re Chem-Met Services, 1993 RCRA LEXIS at *20.
142. See id. at *20-21.
"143. See supra notes 33-61 and accompanying text.
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The subsequent decision in Goodner Brothers Aircraft exacerbated
the enforcement problem caused by Shell Oil by applying that decision
retroactively.1 " As a result EPA is unable to utilize the federal mixture
rule in enforcement cases brought during the period between promulgation
of the rule in 1980 and the holding in Shell Oil in 1992 because, in effect,
the rule never existed.
The most recent erosion of EPA's enforcement program came in
the decision in Hardin County IV which stripped EPA of its ability to
utilize state mixture rules in pending enforcement cases. 4  Although no
court has addressed the issue of whether states may enforce their own
mixture rules, it is likely that, if state mixture rules have been duly
promulgated under applicable state administrative procedures, they will
remain valid.
4 6
Although it seems that these decisions "threw the baby out with the
bath water," there may be some water left. EPA's only true recourse at
this point is to abandon the argument that state mixture rules are "more
stringent," not "broader in scope," than the federal rules because the
argument has been repeatedly rejected. 4 7 Rather EPA should attempt to
find other provisions in its hazardous waste regulations which bring
substances under the definition of hazardous waste because that course was
successful in Chem-Met Services.
48
144. See supra notes 62-98 and accompanying text.
145. See supra notes 123-25 and accompanying text.
146. See supra notes 136-37 and accompanying text.
147. See supra notes 99-125 and accompanying text.
148. See supra notes 138-42 and accompanying text.
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